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Abstract
This paper analyses the deregulation and restructuring of the global electricity supply industry and its impact upon
fuel usage, generation technologies and suppliers of power plant. Deregulation encouraged the growth of new
independent power producers whose business requirements transformed the power plant industry. The plant suppliers
had to develop new capabilities and services to compete in the global market. Economies of scale and scope became
crucial given the cost of developing the new technologies and providing the services required by the operators. This led
to the global consolidation of the power plant industry because only large-integrated power engineering companies had
the necessary resources and capabilities to compete in the new global environment.
r 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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The deregulation and restructuring of the
electricity supply industry is one of the most
important global energy developments of the last
century. Up to the 1980s most countries relied
upon state-owned monopolies to finance, con-
struct, own and operate the electricity supply
network. Since the mid-1990s, more than 30
countries or regions within countries have intro-
duced policies to reform their electricity supply
industries (Besant-Jones and Tenenbaum, 2001).
Power plant manufacturers supplying equip-
ment to the electricity supply industry form ang author. Tel.: +44-191-222-8335.
s: tom.mcgovern@ncl.ac.uk (T. McGovern).
front matter r 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserve
.2004.03.006important industrial sector. Annual world orders
for turbine generation equipment total more than
100GW and have an estimated value of $40 bn
(h34 bn)1 (Marsh, 1998). Power plant suppliers
produce customised products on an engineer-to-
order (ETO) basis or standard products on a
make-to-order (MTO) basis. Large steam turbines
tend to be manufactured on an ETO basis, as the
designs are optimised to take account of the local
operating conditions (e.g. ambient temperature,
type of fuel, etc.) of the power station. In contrast,
gas turbines are normally standard units that are
produced on an MTO basis, although there1Exchange rates are based upon the average $/h for the year
indicated unless otherwise stated. The data were obtained from
http://www.oanda.com/convert/fxhistory.
d.
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specific.
The steam power plant market is mature and
cyclical, with supply exceeding demand. Prices
have reduced in real terms over the last decade.
The market for gas turbines has grown rapidly
since deregulation. Customers require fast and
reliable delivery. Demand has shifted from specific
items of plant towards turnkey contracts and
through-life solutions.
Previous research undertaken in the low
volume capital goods sector has focused on
operational issues including: production control
(Bertrand and Muntslag, 1993); information sys-
tems (Wortmann, 1995); the co-ordination of
marketing and manufacturing (Konijnendijk,
1994); supply chains (McGovern et al., 1999;
Hicks et al., 2000b); manufacturing layout (Hicks,
2004); scheduling (Pongcharoen, 2001; Song,
2001b; Pongcharoen et al., 2002; Song et al.,
2002) and company structure (Hicks et al., 2000a,
2001).
There has been no systematic and comprehen-
sive review of the impact of deregulation of the
electricity supply industry on capital goods sup-
pliers. Deregulation is the most important change
that has affected power plant suppliers since 1989.
This is because new market mechanisms have
changed the economics of power generation, the
relative attractiveness of different types of fuel and
power plant, the source and availability of financeTable 1
World electricity consumption (billion kilowatthours) by region, 1990
History
Region 1990 1999
Industrialised countries 6385 7517
United States 2817 3236
EE/FSU 1906 1452
Developing countries 2258 3863
China 551 1084
India 257 424
South Korea 93 233
Other developing Asia 357 578
Central & South America 449 684
Total World 10,549 12,833and the willingness of power generators to accept
risk.
The primary objective of this paper is to explore
the impact of deregulation and the restructuring of
the global electricity supply industry on the power
plant suppliers. Policy outcomes are described and
analysed. In particular, how the introduction of
competition in one industry led to rationalisation
and consolidation in another. The competitive
forces that were unleashed undermined the cosy
relationships that had previously existed between
the indigenous power plant suppliers and the state-
owned utilities. The concomitant growth in
independent power producers (IPPs) placed new
demands on the suppliers, which encouraged the
power plant companies to develop new capabilities
in project management, project finance and the
provision of new services. Furthermore, the
inherent risks in the new competitive environment,
along with the returns demanded by investors,
provided a stimulus to gas turbine applications at
the expense of steam turbine production. These
changes benefited the large integrated power
engineering companies, because only they had
the financial resources and capabilities to compete
in the new global market. The power plant
industry is now dominated by three global
companies: Alstom, General Electric (GE) and
Siemens, which together satisfy 80% of global
demand. Finally, the strategic and financial
strategies of the three companies are analysed–2020 (EIA, 2002)
Projections
2005 2010 2015 2020
8620 9446 10,281 11,151
3793 4170 4556 4916
1651 1807 2006 2173
4912 6127 7548 9082
1523 2031 2631 3349
537 649 784 923
309 348 392 429
724 872 1012 1157
788 988 1249 1517
15,182 17,380 19,385 22,407
ARTICLE IN PRESS
T. McGovern, C. Hicks / Int. J. Production Economics 89 (2004) 321–337 323in the context of the global demand for power
plant.2. The global market for electricity
Marsh (2000) estimated that the worldwide
electricity supply industry was valued at $1000 bn
(h1085 bn) per year. Table 1 shows the breakdown
of world electricity consumption by region. In
1999, world electricity consumption totalled
12,833 billion kilowatt hours (KwHr) and is
projected to increase to 22,407 billion kilowatt
hours by 2020. There is a considerable increase in
demand forecast for all regions of the world.
However, the growth in demand in developing
countries is predicted to increase faster than in
industrialised countries. There will therefore be a
particularly strong demand for power plant in the
developing countries.
2.1. Energy usage for electricity generation
Fig. 1 shows world energy demand from 1970 to
1990 with forecasts up to 2020. The increase in
demand for electricity is being driven by the
widespread use of computers, domestic appliances,
telecommunication products and electrically pow-
ered transportation systems. The use of natural
gas for the generation of electricity is expected to
grow rapidly over the period to 2020. United
States demand for natural gas is expected toFig. 1. World energy demand for electricity generation 1970–
2020 (EIA, 2002).increase its share of the electricity fuel market
from 15% in 1999 to 32% by 2020. Likewise in
Western Europe, gas is expected to double from
14% to 28% over the same period. In Central and
South America gas is projected to grow from 11%
to 32% (EIA, 2002). Gas has become a preferred
fuel for a number of reasons. Compared with
coal-fired power stations, new combined cycle
gas turbines (CCGTs) have low capital cost.
Shorter construction times allow for greater
flexibility in deciding when to build new stations.
Modular design makes them ideal for turnkey
contracts. They consume less fuel and have lower
emissions of carbon and nitrogen dioxides (Hicks
et al., 2000a).
Coal will remain an important fuel for electricity
generation, though its share of the world’s
electricity fuel market is projected to decline from
36% in 1999 to 32% by 2020. In the United States,
coal’s share of the market is expected to decline
from 51% to 46% over the same period. A similar
trend is forecast for Western Europe, where coal
held a 23% share in 1999, which is forecast to fall
to 15% by 2020. Forecasts for Asia project a
decline from 62% to 51% over this period.
Nuclear generation is also expected to decline in
many regions of the world as a result of opera-
tional safety concerns, waste disposal issues,
concerns about nuclear arms proliferation and
decommissioning and operating costs. The use of
oil for electricity generation has declined since the
second oil crisis in 1979. Oil accounted for 23% of
electricity fuel use in 1977, but in 1999 its share
was under 10% (EIA, 2002).
2.2. Deregulation and restructuring of the
electricity supply industry
Throughout the world there has been a shift
from engineering-led, vertically integrated electri-
city industries operating on a cost-plus basis to
competitive markets. Electricity reform has been
motivated by: technological developments, parti-
cularly the improved efficiency of gas turbines; the
need for increased investment, especially in devel-
oping countries; high electricity prices and a shift
away from the view that electricity supply is a
natural monopoly. Countries have introduced a
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including:
* the privatisation of electricity assets;
* attracting foreign investment;
* the unbundling of energy services and assets
through the separation of the ownership of
generation, transmission, distribution and mar-
keting;
* the creation of electricity trading arrangements
(pools) and retail competition;
* the establishment of independent system opera-
tors;
* the deregulation of electricity prices;
* open access to the grid (EIA, 2002).
Most industrialised countries saw privatisation
as a way of increasing efficiency and transferring
the requirement for capital to the private sector.
The way that privatisation has been implemented
varies from country to country. The privatisation
model adopted by the United Kingdom, in which a
state-owned enterprise is split into smaller entities
and then transferred to the private sector, is
common. However, in less developed countries
‘privatisation’ is interpreted as allowing private,
and in many cases foreign capital, to finance and
operate a plant that would have previously
been procured and operated by government.
Investors are rewarded from revenues generated
from the operation of the facility. At the end of the
concession period ownership is transferred to the
government. This arrangement is attractive to
some host governments because it addresses power
supply problems at the margins without disturbing
the structure of the domestic industry; thereby
avoiding some of the difficult issues raised by
privatisation (Dunkerley, 1995).
Power projects have traditionally been financed
by the public sector. In developing countries, the
World Bank has also played a prominent role as a
financier and policy advisor to governments.
Indeed, the Bank has been the largest provider of
capital for power projects in these countries
(World Bank, 1993). For example, between 1984
and 1999, the World Bank provided $7 bn
(h6.6bn)2 for energy-related projects in China, of2The $/h conversion rate is based upon the average for 1999.which about half was for the construction of
twelve coal-fired power stations (Martinot, 2001).
In the early 1990s, the funding of energy
projects in developing countries by governments
and multi-lateral agencies was declining, while
demand for electricity was increasing rapidly. The
World Bank estimated that these traditional
sources of capital would be able to finance only
10% of the $100 bn (h85.4 bn) needed annually to
meet the energy requirements of these countries
(Strickland and Sturm, 1998). The Bank concluded
that developing countries would need to raise
finance from the private capital markets to meet
their electricity requirements. This was reflected in
the new lending policy of the World Bank. One of
the new conditions was that countries should
restructure their electricity supply industry. This
policy resulted in ‘‘the unbundling, commercialisa-
tion, and privatisation of state-owned utilities, the
introduction of independent regulation, and the
attraction of private investment and management
services’’ (Strickland and Sturm, 1998, p. 874).
Asia and Latin America became major targets
for private investors. Between 1990 and 1999,
Asia’s electricity sector attracted $93 bn (h87.3)3
billion of private investment, of which 72% was
for greenfield projects (EIA, 2002). Private sector
investment has largely been restricted to genera-
tion projects, with transmission and distribution
being controlled by government. The drawback
for investors is that for political reasons tariff rates
may be set too low, and hence be insufficient to
cover the cost of generation without the support of
government subsidies. Over the same period, Latin
America attracted $78 bn (h82.8 bn) of private
investment (EIA, 2002). In many of these coun-
tries, transmission and distribution as well as
generation were open to private investment.
Indeed, in some cases, foreign investors were
allowed to acquire domestic utilities.
These changes have made the global markets for
power plant more competitive. The once cosy
relationships between power plant suppliers and
local state-owned utilities have been replaced by
tough international competition between global
power plant companies.3The $/h conversion rate is based upon the average for 1999.
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This section examines the global changes in the
demand for gas turbines and steam turbines for
fossil-fuelled and nuclear power plant. The world’s
installed capacity is analysed in terms of its age,
which influences orders for new plant, retrofit and
refurbishment services.
3.1. Power plant orders by type
Fig. 2 shows the annual demand for power plant
for the period 1975–1999. Until the late 1980s, the
majority of demand was for steam turbines
supplied to state-owned utilities. Gas-powered
units were generally limited to providing backup
and producing power during peak demand peri-
ods. However, the demand for gas turbines
increased dramatically during the 1990s, when
many countries deregulated their electricity supply
industries. In 1999, orders for gas turbines totalled
67GW, which was 58% of total demand. The total
orders for steam turbines were 17GW for com-
bined cycle (CC) plant, 31GW for fossil fuel
generation and approximately 8GW for nuclear
power stations. This increase in gas turbine orders
(at the expense of steam turbines) reflects the
preference for the use of gas as a fuel.
3.2. Power plant orders by region
In the early 1990s, Asia was the most important
market in the world for new power plant. BetweenFig. 2. Annual orders for power plant (adapted from Salmon,
2002).1993 and 1997, Asia and Australia accounted for
51% of power plant orders by volume measured in
gigawatt output (Marsh, 1998). However, the
Asian economic crisis is 1997–1998 led to many
projects being put on hold. This market is picking
up slowly. Fig. 3 shows that in 1999 the United
States accounted for half the total orders, followed
by East Asia (mainly Japan and China) 23% and
Western Europe with 7%.
There was a significant growth in investment in
power plant construction in the United States
from the late 1990s until 2002 because of the
decrease in the energy-reserve margin (the percen-
tage excess of excess generating capacity available
during times of peak demand) due to low
investment in earlier periods (Alstom, 2001). In
May 2001, the United States Government pub-
lished its energy plan in which the demand for
electricity in the United States was forecast to
increase by 45% by 2020. Due to the outdated and
inefficient nature of much of America’s power
generation capacity, it is estimated that between
1300 and 1900 new power stations will need to be
built during this period (Marsh, 2001). However,
the recent economic slowdown has triggered a
temporary decline in orders. Electricity generators
have also reduced investment to strengthen their
balance sheets in the wake of the collapse of Enron
(Alstom, 2002).
In the United States and some Western Eur-
opean countries gas turbines accounted for more
than 90% of new power plant orders (Marsh,
1999). Gas turbines are available with capacities
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turbines are mainly powered by coal or nuclear
fuel. A steam turbine in a fossil fuel power station
typically generates 500–700MW, although some
1300MW units were installed in the United States
in the 1970s. Steam turbines in nuclear power
plants were rated up to 1500MW and the
technology is available to increase the rating up
to 2000MW (Termuehlen, 2001). Thus, power
stations using gas turbines normally require more
turbines than those that use steam. However,
steam turbine plants require large and expensive
boilers to generate the steam. Coal-fired stations
additionally require coal pulverisation and desul-
phurisation plant. Small steam turbines are also
required for combined cycle plants. They have gas
turbines as the major prime mover generating
approximately two-thirds of the plant output with
the remaining third being produced by a steam
turbine (Termuehlen, 2001).
Steam turbines currently account for about half
the world’s generation capacity. Steam technology
is likely to continue to be the preferred option of
those countries with abundant coal reserves.
China, for example, is the second largest producer
of electricity in the world, with three-quarters of its
output generated by coal-fired plants (Martinot,
2001). India is similarly dependent upon coal
(Himberg, 1995). The market share for coal and
nuclear powered stations is predicted to decline.
However, higher natural gas prices may make the
construction of new coal-fired plants a more viable
option in the future. Environmental legislation has
stimulated the development of clean coal technol-
ogies that minimise emissions and allow low-grade
coal to be used. These new technologies are
particularly important in Eastern Europe and Asia
because these regions are highly dependent upon
coal (Alstom, 2002).
3.3. Installed power plant
In 1950, the world’s power stations generated
100GW of electricity. By 1999, the global installed
power generation capacity had grown to approxi-
mately 3500GW, of which conventional steam
represented 54% of installed capacity, hydropower
21%, nuclear 11%, gas turbines 12% and diesel2.3% (Alstom, 2001). More than half the world’s
installed capacity is located in North America and
Europe (Marsh, 1998). Fig. 4 shows the break-
down of global installed capacity by age. It can be
seen that nearly all of the capacity that was
installed prior to 1970 was based upon either
conventional steam turbines (ST) or hydro tech-
nologies. The period from 1970 saw the growth of
nuclear-powered steam turbines, although this
declined in the 1990s when there was a substantial
growth in installed gas turbine capacity.
It can be seen from Fig. 4 that a significant
proportion of steam turbine installed capacity is
currently over 30 years old. This will increase over
the next 5 years. There is therefore a growing
market for the replacement and refurbishment of
aging steam turbine plant.4. Services
There has been a strong growth in the provision
of services associated with power plant. The
overall global power plant market was approxi-
mately $125 bn (h139.6 bn) in 2001. This com-
prised 48% new equipment sales, 36% services
outsourced by the power generators, with the
remainder consisting mainly of civil construction
works. The service market is growing rapidly due
to increased outsourcing by electricity generators
together with the large number of coal-fired plants
that require modernisation (Alstom, 2002). The
market for services is becoming increasingly
attractive for power plant suppliers because it
attracts high margins.
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Generator capacity (GW) growth by company type, 1998–2007
(Marsh, 1998)
Utilities
GW
IPPs
GW
Total growth
GW
Asia 195 134 329
North America 44 104 148
Europe 72 65 137
South America 24 71 95
Africa/Middle East 35 37 72
Total 370 411 781
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owned utilities to purchase individual items of
plant such as turbines, boilers and other equip-
ment for new power stations from different
suppliers. They would finance and project manage
the plant construction. However, after deregula-
tion the power generators sought to procure entire
power stations from a single supplier. With
liberalisation the traditional utilities and indepen-
dent power producers have become more cost
conscious. Instead of demanding equipment with
long life components, the power producers prefer
to spread cost over the life of the plant by spending
more on servicing in later years. Many services
previously conducted in-house by the generators
have been outsourced.
The plant suppliers have established closer ties
with the operators to replace the previous arms-
length relationships. This is because the power
plant suppliers are being invited to participate and
invest in new plant construction and to manage
power stations in build-operate-transfer (BOT)
and build-operate-own (BOO) agreements with
utilities. After the concession period has expired,
the ownership of the BOT scheme is transferred to
the utility or government at no cost or at a pre-
agreed price.
The intense competition for contracts for new
power plant has encouraged the power plant
suppliers to expand their maintenance, retrofit
and refurbishment business for installed plant.
This strategy was particularly appropriate for
steam turbine manufactures because of the decline
in new orders coupled with the aging profile of the
installed capacity.
These market changes have coincided with the
development of information and communication
technologies, which have enabled the suppliers to
provide more sophisticated services. For example,
Internet-based remote turbine health monitoring
helps with the optimisation of the plant. Such
systems relay information on vibration, fuel,
temperature and power output. This allows
engineers to analyse operational data and offer
advice on problems as they occur. Suppliers are
able to develop a library of performance data from
their installations around the world, allowing them
to offer more sophisticated service packages. Thesenew technologies are incorporated in new plant
and are supplied for older plant as a retrofit
service.
At one time, the plant suppliers managed spare
parts and services on a transactional basis. Now
they see services as a means of establishing close
links with their customers, as well as an opportu-
nity to provide product upgrades. Not surpris-
ingly, the major suppliers have developed more
service capabilities. The growth of independent
power producers has encouraged the development
of new services, including the provision of turnkey
projects and the operation of power plant.5. Independent power producers
Deregulation of the electricity industry in the
industrialised and developing countries encour-
aged new independent power producers (IPPs) to
enter into the market. In 1996, IPPs accounted for
30% of the market for new power plant, compared
with less than 5% 10 years previously (Wagstyl,
1996). IPPs were first established in the United
States and the United Kingdom following dereg-
ulation. They have spread to other countries that
require private finance to fund their growing
electricity needs (in particular developing nations
in Asia).
Table 2 shows the expected growth in generator
capacity between 1998 and 2007. It is predicted
that 52% of the additional capacity to be installed
worldwide during this period will be controlled by
IPPs. It is forecast that 70–75% of capacity will be
installed by IPPs in North and South America.
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Asia 41% (Marsh, 1998).
There are several types of independent power
producers including traditional utilities operating
in new markets, merchant generators, fuel tolling
companies and energy traders. Some traditional
utilities facing competition in their own regulated
markets have become IPPs in new markets
(e.g. Electricit!e de France, Tractabel and Duke
Energy). These utilities, whether state-controlled
or privately owned, often finance new projects
with loans secured against their balance sheets,
whereas other IPPs have to raise project finance.
In the case of government-owned utilities, new
projects can be supported by government guaran-
tees. In some countries IPPs operate through an
‘offtake’ contract in which electricity distributors
agree to purchase a specified level of output from
the generator at a specified price.
Merchant generators sell energy and capacity
into an open market, such as a wholesale power
exchange or ‘pool’, rather than under contract
with a utility. They lock in margins through price
indexation arrangements that pass up to 75% of
the price risk back to the fuel supplier (Maclaine,
2001). It has been estimated that by 2002 merchant
generators are likely to account for 20% of
all United States generation capacity (McIsaac
et al., 2000).
Another arrangement is fuel tolling. Here the
generator acts as a ‘contract manufacturer of
electricity’ (Bleveans, 2000). The fuel supplier
contracts with the generator (a purchase power
agreement) to convert its fuel into electricity,
which is then consumed by the generator or sold
to a third party. The fuel supplier pays a capacity
fee to the generator for its conversion service
and receives a power price netback from the plant.
The capacity fee is designed to cover the fixed
costs of maintaining plant availability, the variable
costs associated with converting fuel into electri-
city, as well as a return to investors. The generator
only takes a risk on plant availability and in
return earns stable, but low returns. The fuel
supplier bears the risks associated with fuel costs,
but can earn high returns by effectively arbitraging
differences between the fuel and electricity mar-
kets. Enron’s Sutton Bridge power project inthe United Kingdom is an example of a tolling
plant.
Energy traders such as Enron or TXU Europe
view a gas-fired station as a call option in their
trading portfolios. If the wholesale price of gas is
higher than the electricity price, the trader will sell
gas. However, if the electricity price rises, the
trader can request that the power plant generates
electricity. With a power plant efficiency of 50%
the netback value of the gas to the trader is
approximately half the electricity price.
These new entrants are imposing new demands,
primarily of cost and speed, on power plant
suppliers. This has encouraged a large growth in
demand for combined cycle gas turbine plant, as
these can be built relatively cheaply and can be
operational within 2 years. They also produce
lower emissions. Competition between the power
plant suppliers has focused on developing ever
more efficient turbines. However, during the
1990s, three major suppliers (Alstom, GE and
Siemens) experienced problems with their turbines.
As a result, the IPPs prefer to rely on tried and
tested technology, or to secure manufacturer
commitments, including consequential loss cover,
for new technology. One of the consequences of
the turbine problems was to drive a number of the
EPCs (engineering, procurement and construction)
contractors out of the market.
Building new power plant in any deregulated
market (especially in developing countries) incurs
considerable risks. These can be categorised as
political, construction, operational, revenue, fi-
nance and legal (Gupta and Sravat, 1998; Wang
and Tiong, 2000). All parties involved in the
project incur risks whether it is the power
purchaser, the project developer or the providers
of finance. The successful mitigation of these
risks is critical to a project’s financial feasibility
(Himberg, 1995).
Typically, a consortium is organised to invest
equity into a scheme, which may account for 25%
of the project capital cost. This level of equity is
usually required to convince lenders of the viability
of the project and governments of commitment to
the success of the BOT and BOO project over
the concessionary period (Tiong, 1995). The
consortium usually includes the power equipment
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plant orders. The remaining 75% of the project is
normally financed by a combination of syndicated
commercial bank loans, bond issues, bridge and
backup facilities, and multilateral and export
credit agency loans and guarantees (Dailami and
Leipziger, 1998). This project finance is provided
on a ‘non-recourse’ basis with lender’s rights
relating only to the assets and future earnings of
the project (Howcroft and Fadhley, 1998). The
balance sheets of the parent companies are not put
at risk. It has been suggested that risk management
objectives are the main reasons why project
finance is preferred to more traditional debt
structures (Pollio, 1998).
In BOT schemes, the project sponsor normally
incurs all of the risks throughout the construction
and operating periods, providing guarantees in
terms of insurance or liquidated damages that the
project will be completed on time and satisfy the
agreed operating criteria (Tiong, 1990). Banks
assume little or no risk in the construction and
start up phases when the project is absorbing cash
and generating no revenues. Instead, project loans
become ‘non-recourse’ only after the project is
operational and lenders are assured that it satisfies
the contractual requirements (Pollio, 1998). BOT
schemes normally include a power-purchase agree-
ment, whereby a local utility agrees to buy the
output. Electricity and fuel price risks are therefore
transferred to the utility.
The power station developer would normally
require an internal rate of return of 15–20% on the
total project or 20–30% on invested capital
(Himberg, 1995). The specific rate will depend
upon the country’s risk profile, as well as risks
associated with the particular project. In China,
the main concern of the Government has been that
the returns earned by foreign investors is excessive
(Wang and Tiong, 2000). In some countries,
government may impose restrictions on the profit-
ability of IPPs in order to control the level of tariff
charges to the public. Governments may pursue
this policy by stipulating a maximum rate of return
or by adopting a price-capping model (Lam, 1999).
Despite the attractiveness of many of these
investments, raising debt capital is a major
constraint. One explanation is that only 30–40banks worldwide have traditionally provided
project finance (Bond and Carter, 1995). A further
constraint is that international commercial bank
loans are typically for 7–12 years. However, power
projects need financing for ten or more years if the
tariffs necessary to service the debt are not to be
prohibitive. Consortia have tried to resolve this
problem by obtaining finance for ten years and
then refinancing it later, usually after the con-
struction work has been completed. Other innova-
tions include 25 year IPP bonds and the
development of local capital markets.
Power plant suppliers have had to respond to a
new customer base in which the focus is primarily
on minimising capital costs and plant construction
lead-times. These changes arising from deregula-
tion and liberalisation of the power generation
industry has encouraged a consolidation of the
power plant industry.6. Rationalisation of the power plant industry
The success factors in the power plant industry
are technology, quality, cost, company size and
international spread (Alstom, 2001). There is
global overcapacity in the market for steam
turbines, but there is significant under-capacity
for gas turbines.
The smaller power plant companies, particularly
those in the United Kingdom, found it increasingly
difficult to compete in international markets. Their
previous advantage had been achieved through
flexibility and the ability to design plant to satisfy
specific customer needs. They supplied plant as
part of a consortium with the customer financing
and managing the project. However, the new
electricity generators were now seeking project
finance and turnkey solutions. They were also
more cost conscious and demanded shorter
delivery times than the publicly owned utilities.
The main problem was that some of the smaller
companies had invested in assets and capabilities
to meet the requirements of the state-owned
utilities. Most of their orders were for the home
market. These requirements were regulated and
determined by the utilities in line with government
policies. The liberalisation of the energy markets
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T. McGovern, C. Hicks / Int. J. Production Economics 89 (2004) 321–337330exposed their inability to develop the capabilities
and resources to compete in the more competitive
environment. Some of these companies were also
locked into steam turbine technology, which was
being displaced by gas turbines in the United
States and Europe. The smaller companies became
vulnerable to takeover as the larger integrated
companies sought acquisitions and alliances to
share development costs, mitigate risks, and to
access global markets.
In the late 1980s, the General Electric Company
of the United Kingdom and Alcatel Alsthom of
France merged their power and transport busi-
nesses to form GEC-Alsthom (renamed Alstom in
1998). ASEA of Sweden and Brown Boveri of
Switzerland merged their operations to form ABB.
This trend continued into the 1990s. In 1997,
Siemens purchased the energy operations of
Westinghouse of the United States. Alstom
merged its power engineering business with those
of ABB in 1999. The following year Alstom
bought out ABB’s share of the joint venture.
The mergers and takeovers of the late 1990s and
the early part of this century are probably the final
piece in the post-war restructuring of the world’s
power plant industry. Large global companies
have replaced former national champions. Three
companies currently dominate the world power
plant market: General Electric (GE), Siemens and
Alstom. In 2000, these companies accounted for
80% of all new power plant orders worldwide
rated by power output (GW). This high level of
industry concentration has been brought about by
the series of mergers and takeovers outlined above.
The consolidation of the industry is also a
response to overexpansion by the power plant
suppliers in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The
suppliers were anticipating growing orders from
independent power providers in Europe and North
America following deregulation and from utilities
in Asia (especially China) to meet their expanding
electricity requirements. These orders did not
materialise as quickly as forecast, leading to
overcapacity. At the same time, there was down-
ward pressure on electricity prices, which squeezed
the profit margins of the generators. The operators
in response demanded lower prices from the power
plant suppliers, leading to a 30% reduction inprices between 1993 and 1996. The full order book
since the late 1990s has reversed this position,
leading to a waiting list for gas turbines. For
example, the capital price for a new combined
cycle plant rose from $400/kw (h447/kw) in the
mid 1990s to $500/kw (h559) in 20014 (Maclaine,
2001).
6.1. The dash for gas
Another major change that has impacted on the
industry is the growth in the past two decades in
the use of gas as a fuel rather than steam generated
from coal or oil. Table 3 shows that GE dominates
the global gas turbine market with a 44% share in
1999, followed by Siemens with 27% and Alstom
with 13%. Alstom is the leader in the steam
turbine market with a 24% market share. The
upsurge in orders for gas turbines in the United
States from 1998 has largely benefited GE
followed by Siemens. In 2000, GE secured 71%
of new orders for gas turbines in the United States
followed by Siemens with 23% (Marsh, 2001).
Alstom had previously licensed the technology for
its heavy-duty gas turbines from GE. This agree-
ment precluded Alstom from selling this equip-
ment in the United States. However, following its
merger with ABB, the new Group reached an
agreement with GE, whereby the latter agreed to
purchase Alstom’s heavy-duty gas turbine business
and to revoke the technology licence. This would
allow Alstom to sell ABB’s version of gas turbines
anywhere in the world, including the United
States.
Alstom and Siemens’ market position could
improve if the demand for new coal-fired steam
turbine plants increases. Some utilities may also
add a steam cycle stage to existing gas-powered
plants to increase efficiency. Any increase in orders
from Asia may well be to the benefit of Alstom, the
market leader in steam turbine technology. Steam
turbines account for about half the world’s
electricity generation capacity. This technology is
likely to be the preferred option of those countries
with abundant coal and oil reserves.
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Siemens
The three companies that dominate the power
plant market are GE, Alstom and Siemens, which
are global multi-product companies. Table 4
compares the financial performance of the com-
panies. The calculations are based upon ‘headline
earnings’ (normalised data) as advocated by theTable 3
Global power generation equipment, market share % by GW
output (Marsh, 2000)
Company Steam turbines Gas turbines
1999 1999
GE 17 44
Siemensa 11 27
Alstomb 24 13
Mitsubishi 7 7
Others 41 9
Total 100 100
aIncluding Westinghouse.
b Including ABB.
Table 4
A financial comparison of Alstom, GE and Siemens
Alstom
1999 2000 2001
Turnover (hm) 14,069 16,229 20,450
Normalised trading profit (hm) 590 226 899
Earnings before interest and tax (hm) 773 337 1108
Trading capital employed (hm) 6295 9146 11,326
Overall capital employed (hm) 6820 10,508 12,950
Trading profit/sales (%) 4.19 1.39 3.66
Return on capital employed (%) 11.33 3.21 8.56
Normalised earnings per share (h) 1.68 0.52 2.63
Minimum Price/earnings ratio 9.43 41.63 8.23
Maximum Price/earnings ratio 18.77 65.38 12.32
Current ratio 1.06 1.05 0.95
Stocks/sales(%) 25.25 20.50 24.64
Working capital/sales(%) 27.76 26.05 26.63
Debt/equity (%) 75.84 176.32 221.55
Debt/capital employed (%) 18.85 33.88 37.51
Notes: Figures for GE exclude GE Capital Services Inc, except for no
the consolidated accounts.
aDollar to Euro conversions obtained from the FX Currency Co
sheet dates.
bSiemens 1999 figures translated from Deutch Marks to Euro on tInstitute of Investment Management and Research
(1993). The normalisation process aims to reflect
the outcome of normal trading operations. Several
items are excluded, for example, profits and losses
on the sale or termination of operations; profits
and losses relating to the disposal of fixed assets;
amortisation of goodwill and profits or losses
associated with the disposal of trade investments.
In the case of General Electric, the activities of
General Electric Capital Services (GECS) have
been excluded to enable the engineering segments
of the business to be directly compared with those
of Siemens and Alstom.
In terms of group turnover, GE (excluding
GECS) and Siemens are of comparable size and
both are much larger than Alstom. GE is
significantly more profitable than its rivals. Indeed,
in 2001, Siemens made a substantial loss due to
losses incurred in its semi-conductor and informa-
tion and communication businesses. Alstom’s and
Siemen’s profit margins have been less than 6%
each year, whereas GE’s margins have been
around 25%. Similarly, the return on capitalGeneral Electrica Siemensb
1999 2000 2001 1999 2000 2001
59,844 73,278 83,093 68,581 78,396 87,000
21,325 18,118 14,000 3018 4543 (1100)
14,466 18,647 21,814 3068 6566 54
19,297 22,815 23,489 24,756 36,281 44,917
60,256 72,783 85,101 36,244 48,077 48,231
23.39 24.73 25.66 2.25 5.79 (1.26)
24.01 25.62 25.63 8.47 13.66 0.11
1.09 1.37 1.60 1.96 3.52 (1.19)
28.83 32.30 19.89 13.74 14.39 (31.51)
48.78 46.90 37.25 29.35 36.27 (88.88)
0.73 0.86 0.82 1.15 1.34 1.33
9.65 10.36 11.27 9.15 8.51 15.41
15.77 15.54 15.52 26.07 25.04 25.24
6.84 3.46 4.50 42.13 35.62 55.93
4.90 2.60 3.33 20.00 19.00 32.28
rmalised earnings per share and P/E ratio which are based upon
nverter (http://www.oanda.com/convert/classic) on the balance
he balance sheet date.
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than at the other two companies. Alstom, in
particular, is carrying heavy levels of debt.
Traditionally, Alstom’s principal source of liquid-
ity has been cash generated from its operations.
The increase in working capital requirements,
together with major acquisitions over the last 4
years, has proved a drain on internal resources.
The creation of the joint venture ABB Alstom
Power and the subsequent purchase of ABB’s
stake were particularly significant. The Company
has had to rely more on long and short-term
borrowings. Alstom has also had to set aside
provisions to solve technical difficulties and to
compensate customers who have purchased the
GT24–26 range of gas turbines. In comparison,
GE has very low levels of debt (excluding GE
Capital Services, which has very high short-term
debt levels).
GE attributes its success to a number of factors.
The Company has trained 80,000 people in Six
Sigma and has completed 500,000 projects. GE
has also invested $10 bn (h10.44 bn)5 in informa-
tion technology between 1998 and 2001. Both
Six Sigma and ‘digitization’ have been introduced
into the supply chain to provide integration
with customers and suppliers. GE seeks to balance
its ‘long-cycle’ and ‘short-cycle’ businesses. The
‘long-cycle’ businesses include Power Systems,
Aircraft Engines, Medical Systems and Transpor-
tation Systems. These businesses contributed
approximately 40% of GE’s net earnings in 2001.
The ‘short-cycle’ businesses including Appliances,
Lighting, Plastics, Industrial Systems, Speciality
Materials and NBC broadcasting contributed
approximately 20% of GE’s net earnings. The
Financial Services Businesses contributed the
remaining 40% of net earnings (which have
been excluded from Table 4). GE’s focus
has changed. In 1980, it derived 85% of its
revenues from the sale of hardware. In 2000,
70% of its turnover was from the sale of services
(GE, 2000).5Based upon the average $/h rate between 1 January 1998
and 31 December 2001.6.3. Competitive strategy and financial
performance of the power plant businesses
The success factors in the power plant industry
are technology, quality, price, company size and
international presence. The high level of capital
investment undertaken by all three companies
underlines the importance of technology and
production. The strategy of the ‘big three’ was to
establish a global presence in the major markets
for power plant equipment and services. This
allowed them to balance their production to meet
the upturns and downturns in the respective
markets. For example, from 1988 to 1998, there
was an upturn in the demand for power plant in
Asia. This was curtailed by the financial instability
that occurred in the Asian Economies in the late
1990s. This downturn in Asia was, however, more
than offset by the boom in demand for gas
turbines in the United States in the late 1990s.
By 2002, this growth in demand had slowed due to
the economic downturn and market uncertainty
caused by the demise of Enron.
In 1998, Siemens increased its presence in the
United States through the acquisition of Westing-
house. In 2002, Siemens sales by region were
Europe 19%, Americas 62% (of which United
States 52%), Asia Pacific 11% and other 7%.
Alstom had little exposure in the United States
because its licensing agreement with GE prevented
it from selling gas turbines in this market. The
revoking of this agreement following Alstom’s link
with ABB allowed the Company to increase its
presence in this critical market. In 1999, 2.6% of
Alstom’s turnover in power plant was in the
United States with 37.8% in the European Union
and 22.8% in Asia. By 2001, 27.8% of Alstom’s
turnover was in the United States, with 23.2% in
the European Union and 22% in Asia (Alstom,
2001). Thus, Alstom’s acquisition strategy had
enabled the Company to compete in the United
States, whilst maintaining a significant presence in
the other major markets.
These acquisitions also allowed Alstom and
Siemens to increase their installed capacity to
650GW (Salmon, 2002) and 500GW, respectively
(Siemens, 2002). This strategy enabled the compa-
nies to expand their retrofit, refurbishment and
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Table 5
A comparison of the power plant businesses of Alstom, GE and Siemens
Alstom General Electrica Siemensb
1999 2000 2001 1999 2000 2001 1999 2000 2001
Turnoverc (hm) 5698 7120 15,070 10,005 15,783 22,817 11,181 11,583 12,616
Turnover (%) of Group 40.50 45.63 60.09 17.98 23.30 29.72 16.65 15.12 14.32
Operating profit (hm) 449 350 683 1686 2983 5850 (6.65) 381 730
Operating profit (%) of Group 63.51 48.01 59.35 15.21 20.54 33.55 (0.22) 7.37 239.34
Trading profit/sales (%) 7.88 4.92 4.53 16.85 18.90 25.64 (0.06) 3.29 5.79
Capital expenditure (hm) 153 327 401 874 698 508 196 396 566
Capital expenditure/sales (%) 2.69 4.59 2.66 8.74 4.42 2.23 1.75 3.42 4.49
Capital expenditure (%) of Group 39.83 55.79 70.63 25.89 24.16 22.83 4.03 3.67 5.17
Research and Development (hm) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 318 348 408
R & D (%) of Group n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 6.00 6.00 6.00
Notes: Figures for GE exclude GE Capital Services Inc.
aDollar to Euro conversions obtained from the FX Currency Converter (http://www.oanda.com/convert/classic) on the balance
sheet dates.
bSiemens 1999 figures translated from Deutch Marks to Euro on the balance sheet date, Siemens’ figures include power generation
and power transmission and distribution.
c Includes inter-segment sales.
T. McGovern, C. Hicks / Int. J. Production Economics 89 (2004) 321–337 333services to a larger installed base. GE is more
heavily focused upon high value adding services
than its two competitors. In 2002, GE Power
System’s turnover in energy services was $6 bn
(h6.37 bn) and the Company aims to have a
turnover of $10.5 bn (h11.14 bn) by 2005, of which
$1.5 bn (h1.59 bn) will be due to planned acquisi-
tions.6
Table 5 compares the financial performance of
the power plant businesses as stated in the
companies’ segmental accounts. For Alstom and
Siemens, the financial results of the power genera-
tion plant and power transmission and distribu-
tion businesses have been combined to make them
comparable to GE (GE Power Systems includes
power transmission and distribution).
At Alstom turnover increased from h5698m in
1999 to h15070m in 2001 due to the takeover of
ABB’s power engineering business. As a result,
Alstom is more heavily focused on the power plant
industry, which contributed 60.9% of Group
turnover in 2001. Although profit increased after
the acquisition of ABB’s share of ABB Alstom
Power in 2000, the profit margins declined from6The conversions are based upon the average $/h exchange
rate for 2002.7.9% to 4.5%. This was due to technical difficul-
ties relating to the GT24–26 range of gas turbines
(179 and 262MW, respectively). In 2000, it was
discovered that 79 turbines in service had failed to
meet the specified performance criteria. A further
21 turbines remained to be delivered. In September
2000, Alstom established provisions of h1,625m to
cover the cost of technical modifications and
additional contract costs. In February 2002,
Alstom entered into a technology agreement with
Rolls-Royce to acquire aero-engine technology to
improve the operating performance and capability
of the GT24–26 turbines. Alstom’s commitment to
the power plant industry is clear. Its capital
expenditure has increased from h153m in 1999
to h401m in 2001, which represents an increase
from approximately 40% to nearly 71% of Group
investment.
GE Power Systems is the market leader in the
supply of power plant technology. Turnover
increased from h10,005m in 1999 to h22,817m in
2001, whilst profits rose from h1686m to h5850m,
as margins widened from 16.9% to 25.6%. The
proportion of Group operating profit generated by
GE Power Systems increased from 15.2% in 1999
to 33.6% in 2001. GE has significantly higher
profit margins than its competitors because 50%
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provision of high value added services. The
comparable figures for Alstom and Siemens are
approximately 30% of turnover. Another reason is
that in 1995, GE invested heavily in the develop-
ment of ‘F’ turbine technology, which was very
successful. GE was also able to benefit from the
application of its aero-engine technology to its
heavy-duty industrial gas turbines. This gave the
Company a considerable competitive advantage
when the boom in demand for gas turbines
occurred in the United States during the late
1990s. The application of Six Sigma in the
Greenville gas turbine plant in 2000 enabled GE
to reduce cycle times by 29% and to increase
output by more than 200%. The Company is using
e-business to reduce costs through online auctions
and project management initiatives. It is estimated
that this will deliver benefits of $3 bn (h3.3 bn)
between 2000 and 2003 (GE, 2000).
GE’s approach to selling power plant may also
be better suited to the American market. GE
prefers to sell just gas turbines, leaving the
organisation of plant construction to an ‘engi-
neer-constructor’, which includes large consul-
tancy groups such as Bechtel, Raytheon and
Stone and Webster. Siemens and Alstom, in
contrast, have based their strategy around turnkey
projects in which they take the responsibility for
plant construction.
GE started developing the service side of its
business in 1996. Today, about one-third of its
engineers are in services compared with almost
none 10 years previously. The Company has
focused on establishing long-term service agree-
ments of between 12 and 18 years with power plant
operators across the world. It offers operate and
maintenance contracts on new projects as well as
supplying the power plant equipment. In 2001,
customer service agreements totalled $25 bn
(h27.9 bn). This strategy helped to ensure predict-
able life cycle costs for customers and a predictable
revenue stream for GE (GE, 2001). The Company
estimates that contractual service agreements will
deliver revenues of $33 bn (h35 bn)7 by 2005
(Abate and Artigas, 2002). GE Power Systems7Conversion based upon the average $/h rate for 2002.has contractual service agreements in place at 384
customer sites in 40 countries, including 66
contracts to operate and maintain customers’
facilities (GE, 2001).
Turnover at Siemens has stagnated as the
Company has concentrated on its information
and communication and semiconductor busi-
nesses. However, a loss of over h6m in 1999 was
turned around into a profit of h730m in 2001. The
increase in the share of Group profits by the Power
Generation and Power Transmission and Distri-
bution businesses to 239.3% was due to substan-
tial losses in the other operating businesses.
Capital expenditure in the power plant business
increased from h196m in 1999 to h566m in 2001.
This was, however, a small proportion of the
Group’s overall capital expenditure. For example,
in 2001, 5.2% of the Group’s capital expenditure
was in the power plant business. This compared to
26% for the information and communications
operations and over 23% for the Infineon semi-
conductor business. Similarly 6% of Group
research and development expenditure was in
power plant compared to 38% in information
and communications and 18% at Infineon.
The consolidation of the power plant supply
industry may not yet be complete. GE is the
dominant supplier. The Company is more profit-
able than its competitors. It has wider profit
margins and earns a higher return on capital. GE
has significantly lower levels of debt (excluding
GECS). The relative financial weaknesses of
Alstom and Siemens may undermine their ability
to compete effectively. Alstom, in particular, may
have to sell some of its profitable operations, such
as its transmission and distribution business, if it is
to reduce its high levels of debt. Alternatively,
Alstom and Siemens may benefit from an increase
in demand for steam turbines. Any stimulus to
demand may depend upon the relative increase in
the price of gas in relation to coal and nuclear
power.7. Conclusions
The deregulation and restructuring of the
electricity supply industry is one of the most
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century. The implementation of these policies in
both the industrialised and developing countries
has encouraged the consolidation and globalisa-
tion of the power plant industry. Deregulation,
together with the globalisation of the power plant
industry, tilted the economic balance towards the
large integrated power engineering companies. In
the global market, economies of scale and scope
became crucial given the cost of developing the
new technologies and providing the services
required by the operators.
Deregulation encouraged the growth of IPPs
whose business requirements transformed the
power plant industry. These new entrants were
primarily concerned with minimising the capital
cost and reducing the time required for construct-
ing new power stations. The shorter construction
times for gas-fired stations gave them a competi-
tive edge over stations powered by coal or nuclear
fuel, especially in Europe and the United States.
The new independent power producers also
faced considerable risks building power stations
in these newly deregulated markets. Prior to
deregulation, state-owned utilities took responsi-
bility for the financing and project management of
new power stations. After deregulation, the power
generators sought turnkey projects and ‘through-
life’ solutions to meet their requirements. To win
orders, the power plant producers were encour-
aged to join consortia investing in new power
station construction projects. Many of these
projects were organised on build-operate-transfer
and build-operate-own agreements with utilities.
To participate in these ventures, the power plant
suppliers were required to develop expertise in
project management, project finance, risk manage-
ment techniques, as well as providing more
sophisticated services to the operators. Only the
large power plant suppliers were in a position to
bear the commercial and political risks associated
with these operations.
The market for services was expanding rapidly
due to the outsourcing strategies of the power
generators. However, only the large global com-
panies had the financial resources and capabilities
(or were able to acquire firms with the relevant
capabilities) to extend their activities into theprovision of services by developing their knowl-
edge assets. This also allowed them to increase
their margins by moving up the supply chain into
higher value added activities. The growth in
sophisticated information and communication
technologies assisted the power plant suppliers in
the extension of their supply chain activities.
Further, the aging profile of the steam turbine
power plant also benefited the large global
companies that possessed (or were prepared to
acquire) a large installed capacity base. They
expanded their maintenance, retrofit and refurb-
ishment businesses to satisfy the requirements of
the operators.
In summary, to compete in global markets the
capital goods companies supplying power plant
have had to develop capabilities in technology,
marketing, finance, project management and the
provision of services. The ‘big three’, Alstom, GE
and Siemens, have succeeded in meeting this
challenge. All three companies are operating on a
global basis and have developed the global net-
works to respond to the upswings and the down-
swings in the major markets. GE appears to be
better positioned than its rivals in terms of
geography and product offering. Its strategy has
been to rely on internal expansion to satisfy the
growth in demand for gas turbines. GE has also
acquired a number of service companies to
strengthen its position in the provision of services
to the operators. The Company has also focused
on operational excellence through the implemen-
tation of Six Sigma and ‘digitization’. In combina-
tion, this has allowed GE Power Systems to earn
higher margins and to be financially stronger than
its rivals.
Alstom and Siemens have expanded through
acquisitions to extend their global reach. Their
stated strategies are to increase their turnover from
the provision of services, where they are less
focused than GE. These two companies are,
however, financially much weaker than GE.
Alstom, in particular, is carrying heavy levels of
debt and will have to rely on disposals to
strengthen its balance sheet. Siemens, in turn, is
incurring heavy losses in its information and
communication and semiconductor businesses. It
is difficult to see how either of these two
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dominant position of GE.
In conclusion, the deregulation and liberalisa-
tion of the electricity supply industry met the
objectives of policy makers by introducing com-
petition into the indigenous markets. The by-
product, however, was that these policies led to the
reduction in the number of power plant suppliers.
The smaller manufacturers had invested in assets
and capabilities to meet the requirements of the
state-owned utilities. Their output was aimed at
the home market. Some of these companies were
specialist suppliers of steam turbine technology,
which was displaced by gas turbines in Europe and
the United States. The smaller companies became
vulnerable to takeover as the large integrated
companies sought acquisitions to extend their
capabilities and to enter new markets.
References
Abate, R., Artigas, R., 2002. Driving Technology to the
Installed Base, GE Power Systems.
Alstom, 2001. Annual Report—Financial Information Fiscal
Year 2001.
Alstom, 2002. Annual Report—Financial Information Fiscal
Year 2002.
Bertrand, J.W.M., Muntslag, D.R., 1993. Production control in
engineer-to-order firms. International Journal of Produc-
tion Economics 30–31, 3–22.
Besant-Jones, J.E., Tenenbaum, B., 2001. Lessons from
California’s power crisis. Finance and Development 38
(3), 24–28.
Bilger, P., 2001. HSBC CCF Securities Valeurs Fran@aises,
Alstom.
Bleveans, L.E., 2000. Easing the transition to a competitive
electricity market in China: A role for tolling agreements.
The Journal of Project Finance 5 (4), 33–39.
Bond, G., Carter, L., 1995. Financing energy projects:
experience of the international finance corporation. Energy
Policy 23 (11), 967–975.
Dailami, M., Leipziger, D., 1998. Infrastructure project finance
and capital flows: A new perspective. World Development
26 (7), 1283–1298.
Dunkerley, J., 1995. Financing the energy sector in developing
countries: Context and overview. Energy Policy 23 (11),
929–939.
EIA, 2002. International Energy Outlook 2002, Energy
Information Administration, Washington, DC.
GE, 2000. Annual Report.
GE, 2001. Annual Report.
Gupta, J.P., Sravat, A.K., 1998. Development and project
financing of private power projects in developing countries:A case study of India. International Journal of Project
Management 16 (2), 99–105.
Hicks, C., 2004. A genetic algorithm for designing manufactur-
ing facilities in the capital goods industry. International
Journal of Production Economics 90 (2), forthcoming.
Hicks, C., Earl, C.F., McGovern, T., 2000a. An analysis of
company structure and business processes in the capital
goods industry in the UK. IEEE Transactions on Engineer-
ing Management 47 (4), 414–423.
Hicks, C., McGovern, T., Earl, C.F., 2000b. Supply chain
management: A strategic issue in engineer to order
manufacturing. International Journal of Production Eco-
nomics 65 (2), 179–190.
Hicks, C., McGovern, T., Earl, C.F., 2001. A typology of
engineer-to-order companies. International Journal of
Logistics: Research and Applications 4 (1), 43–56.
Himberg, H., 1995. The view from the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC); support to power projects
in Asia. Energy Policy 23 (11), 977–980.
Howcroft, B., Fadhley, S., 1998. Project finance, a credit
strategy based on contractual linkages. The Service In-
dustries Journal 18 (2), 90–111.
Institute of Investment Management and Research, 1993. The
Definition of Headline Earnings: Statement of Investment
Practice No. 1, Institute of Investment Management and
Research, Bromley, UK.
Konijnendijk, P.A., 1994. Co-ordinating marketing and man-
ufacturing in ETO companies. International Journal of
Production Economics 37, 19–26.
Lam, P.T.I., 1999. A sectoral review of risks associated with
major infrastructure projects. International Journal of
Project Management 17 (2), 77–87.
Maclaine, D., 2001. Financial Times. 4th June 2001.
Marsh, P., 1998. Financial Times. 9th June.
Marsh, P., 1999. Financial Times. 10th June.
Marsh, P., 2000. Financial Times. 20th June.
Marsh, P., 2001. Financial Times. 4th June.
Martinot, E., 2001. World Bank energy projects in China:
Influences on environmental protection. Energy Policy 29
(8), 581–594.
McGovern, T., Hicks, C., Earl, C.F., 1999. Modelling supply
chain management processes in engineer-to-order compa-
nies. International Journal of Logistics: Research and
Applications 2 (2), 147–159.
McIsaac, G., Beale, C., Lindenberg, J., 2000. Financing the new
merchant power generation business. The Journal of Project
Finance 6 (1), 13–19.
Pollio, G., 1998. Project finance and international energy
development. Energy Policy 26 (9), 687–697.
Pongcharoen, P., 2001. A Genetic Algorithm for Production
Scheduling in the Capital Goods Industry. Ph.D., Faculty of
Engineering, University of Newcastle.
Pongcharoen, P., Hicks, C., Braiden, P.M., Stewardson, D.J.,
2002. Determining optimum Genetic Algorithm parameters
for scheduling the manufacturing and assembly of complex
products. International Journal of Production Economics
78 (3), 311–322.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
T. McGovern, C. Hicks / Int. J. Production Economics 89 (2004) 321–337 337Salmon, N., 2002. Electrical Power Equipment & Technology
Conference, Alstom.
Siemens, 2002. Securities and Exchange Commission Form
20F. Washington.
Song, D.P., 2001b. Stochastic Models in Planning Complex
Engineering-to-Order Products. Ph.D., Mechanical,
Materials and Manufacturing Engineering, University of
Newcastle upon Tyne.
Song, D.P., Hicks, C., Earl, C.F., 2002. Product due date
assignment for complex assemblies. International Journal of
Production Economics 76 (3), 243–256.
Strickland, C., Sturm, R., 1998. Energy efficiency in World
Bank power sector policy and lending new opportunities.
Energy Policy 26 (11), 873–883.
Termuehlen, H., 2001. 100 years of power plant development:
Focus on steam turbines and gas turbines as prime movers.
ASME Press, New York.Tiong, R., 1990. BOT projects: Risks and securities.
Journal of Construction Management and Economics 8
(3), 315–328.
Tiong, L.K., 1995. Competitive advantage of equity in BOT
tender. Journal of Construction Engineering and Manage-
ment ASCE 121 (3), 282–289.
Wagstyl, S., 1996. Financial Times, 26th June.
Wang, S.Q., Tiong, L.K., 2000. Case study of govern-
ment initiatives for PRC’s BOT power plant projects.
International Journal of Project Management 18 (1),
69–78.
World Bank, 1993. The World Bank’s Role in the Electric
Power Sector: A World Bank Policy Paper. World Bank,
Washington, DC.
Wortmann, H., 1995. Comparison of information systems for
engineer-to-order and make-to-stock situations. Computers
in Industry 26 (3), 261–271.
